Reducing Crop Nutrient Applications: The Yield Reserve Program by Metcalfe, Todd et al.




Todd Metcalfe  
Dept of Ag & Appl. Econ 
Virginia Tech, VA 24061 
Phone: (410) 294-6506 
Email:tmetcalfe@gmail.com 
Darrell J. Bosch 
Dept of Ag & Appl. Econ 
Virginia Tech, VA 24061 
Phone: (540) 231-5265 
Email: bosch@vt.edu 
James W. Pease 
Dept of Ag & Appl. Econ  
Virginia Tech, VA 24061 








Paper prepared for presentation at the American Agricultural Economics 




Copyright 2007 by Todd Metcalfe, Darrell Bosch and James Pease. All rights reserved. Readers may make 
verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright 










A proposed Yield Reserve Program designed to compensate farmers for any reduced 
yields resulting from reduced nitrogen (N) application rates below recommended rates is 
evaluated.  Assuming that farmers currently follow extension recommendations for 
applying N, Yield Reserve Program participation reduces expected net revenue by $10 to 
$13/ha.  The Yield Reserve Program reduces expected net revenue by $17 to $20/ha for 
farmers who apply N to maximize expected net revenue.  Farmers’ costs of participation 
increase with lower probabilities of inadequate rainfall and higher corn prices and decline 
with higher N prices.  The Yield Reserve Program can significantly reduce N applications 
to cropland, which may reduce N content of surface waters, but the costs to taxpayers and 
farmers will depend on how the program is implemented.   
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Agriculture is a major source of nonpoint source (NPS) pollution in the U.S., “degrading 
60 percent of the impaired river miles and half of the impaired lake acreage” (USEPA, 
2004).  Agriculture has also been identified as the largest source of nitrogen (N) pollution 
affecting the Chesapeake Bay (Chesapeake Bay Foundation).  Nitrogen and phosphorus 
(P) nutrients that leave fields as runoff promote eutrophication and algal blooms, which 
  1create anoxic conditions damaging to aquatic species (USEPA, 2006).   
In the Chesapeake Bay agreement of 1987, cooperating states and the District of 
Columbia agreed to reduce nutrient loadings to the Bay by 40% from the 1985 baseline 
(Chesapeake Bay Agreement).  As estimated by the Chesapeake Bay watershed model, 
the nutrient loadings goals were nearly achieved by 2000, but current water quality 
monitoring indicates continued peril for the Bay’s living resources such as fish and 
aquatic vegetation (Chesapeake Bay Program, 2002).  Recent model simulations indicate 
that only 58% of the P, 41% of the N and 54% of the sediment reduction goals necessary 
to assure sustainability of the Bay’s living resources have been achieved (Chesapeake 
Bay Program, 2005).  The 2010 goals of the Program include removal of the Bay and its 
tidal waters from the CWA 303(d) impaired waters list through achievement of 
established Tributary Strategies (Chesapeake Bay Program, undated). 
State and Federal programs seek to mitigate NPS pollution originating from 
farms.  One type of program involves ‘green payments,’ that is, paying farmers for 
adoption of Best Management Practices (BMPs) that mitigate pollution (Ribaudo, Horan, 
and Smith).  The Conservation Reserve Program bidding program uses market 
determined land rental rates to pay farmers a fixed rate to remove highly erodible and 
other environmentally sensitive lands from production (USDA FSA).  The Conservation 
Security Program provides incentive payments for adoption of nutrient management 
planning and applications (USDA NRCS, 2006).  Recently, programs have provided 
insurance to farmers who reduce their nutrient applications to levels specified in Best 
Management Practices guidelines (USDA RMA; BMP Challenge).  These programs 
insure against yield losses resulting from inadequate nutrient applications.   
  2Economic analyses of green payment options have focused on policy instruments 
and methods of targeting policy instruments (Ribaudo, Horan, and Smith).  Wu et al. 
found an inelastic acreage response to payments for adoption of conservation crop 
rotations and tillage implying that such programs would not be cost effective in 
addressing the hypoxia problem in the Gulf of Mexico.  Zhang, Horan, and Claassen 
found that performance-based subsidies to reduce N runoff are first-best in that subsidy 
rates are optimally differentiated to reflect each farm’s delivery of N loads.  However, 
targeted nutrient management subsidies, which focus directly on reducing N applications, 
produce almost equivalent net returns compared to performance subsidies.  This result 
implies that altering N use directly is more efficient than altering land use as a method of 
achieving nutrient reduction goals.  While the need to focus directly on N (or P) 
reductions in order to reduce nutrient pollution is becoming clear, there is less certainty 
as to how this reduction can be achieved most cost effectively with green payments, an 
issue of high importance to policymakers and water quality program leaders.  Nutrient 
management programs which induce farmers to reduce nutrient applications to 
recommended rates can provide ‘win-win’ opportunities to increase net returns and 
reduce pollution (VanDyke et al.).   However, N applications at or below recommended 
rates may still result in N loss, because the crop is not perfectly efficient in removing 
applied N (Scharf and Alley).   
Recently an innovative proposal has been made to reduce nutrient applications 
and nutrient pollution potential by compensating farmers to reduce their N applications 
below standard recommendations (Henry A. Wallace Center).  Such efforts are labeled 
“yield reserve” because a portion of yield production potential is retired just as land is 
  3retired under the Conservation Reserve Program.  This proposal, which has yet to be 
approved, faces implementation challenges such as verification of farmers’ N 
applications and yields.  Nonetheless, interest in the program concept among 
policymakers remains high (U.S. Congress, Senate, 2002a, 2002b).  While the program 
has not been defined for all states, an analysis of the program could help policymakers 
better assess costs to taxpayers and farmers as well as to assess its potential to reduce 
environmental damage from N applications.  The purpose of this study is to examine 
effects of a Yield Reserve Program on costs to farmers and taxpayers and potential 
reductions in N applications.  This study uses existing yield data extrapolated to the 
Virginia coastal plain to analyze costs under three scenarios for implementation of a 
Yield Reserve Program:  insurance payments, incentive payments, and a combined set of 
insurance and enhanced incentive payments.    
Costs of Reducing N Applications 
 
Farmers’ potential costs of reducing N applications under the Yield Reserve Program are 
based on the opportunity cost of foregone net revenues from the N that is not applied.  
Foregone net revenues are calculated from the loss of yield and the savings in N and 
yield-related costs relative to those which would have been obtained prior to Yield 
Reserve.  Assume a farmer’s corn yield (Y) is given by  
) , , ( ) 1 ( S W N f Y =  
where N, W, and S represent N application, weather conditions, and site specific 
characteristics, respectively.  Expected net revenue (NRp) above variable costs under the 
prior N application strategy is  
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  4where Np is the amount of N applied under the prior N application strategy; Ypi is the corn 
yield obtained under the prior application strategy; Pn is the price of N, Pc is the price of 
corn (net of harvest, drying, and transportation costs per unit of yield), and pri is the 
probability of the ith weather state, which can take on I possible values (I is set to 47 in 
the empirical model described below).  Other production costs besides N application are 
assumed fixed and invariant regardless of whether or not the farmer participates in the 
program.  Under the Yield Reserve Program, a farmer’s net revenue is given by 
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where Yyri represents the yield obtained under weather state i and with the N application 
mandated by the Yield Reserve Program, Nyr.  Assuming risk neutrality, the farmer’s 
potential cost of reducing N applications to comply with the Yield Reserve Program is  
(4)
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Potential cost of reducing N applications depends on corn and N prices, weather event 
probabilities, the prior N application strategy, and the amount of N applied under the 
Yield Reserve Program.   
 
Prior N Applications    
Farmers’ N applications are affected by their perceptions of yield risk.  Several studies 
have concluded that N is a yield risk-increasing input, with N applications for strong risk 
  5averters falling by 2% (Babcock, Chalfant, and Collender) to 30% (Rosegrant and 
Roumasset) to 80% (Lambert) below expected profit-maximizing levels.  However, these 
conclusions were based on production functions estimated with experimental yields.  
SriRamaratnam et al. compared farmers’ perceptions of yield risks and N applications 
with experimental data.  While experimental results showed N to be risk increasing, 
farmers viewed N as risk reducing.  Farmers’ subjective yield expectations were more 
optimistic than comparable experimental results.   
Babcock examined the effects of uncertain weather and soil N levels on N 
applications using a linear plateau response function.  Increasing uncertainty about 
weather (rainfall) and soil N levels led to increased optimal N applications due to the 
asymmetry of losses from non-optimal N applications.  Babcock demonstrated that with 
the plateau yield fixed at its mean level, if the price of N is less than half of its marginal 
product with N limiting, optimal N rates under weather uncertainty will be greater than 
under certainty.  Similarly, uncertainty about soil N levels increases optimal N 
application rates when the marginal product of N is more than twice its price.  While 
Babcock’s results assume risk neutrality, he noted that risk aversion is likely to have little 
impact on N applications because, even if N is a risk-reducing input, varying N has 
relatively little impact on yield risk (Babcock; Babcock, Chalfant, and Collender).   
  Babcock’s work implies that in many situations net revenue losses from sub-
optimal N applications that are lower or higher than the optimum level are likely to be 
asymmetrical, meaning net revenue losses from applying too little N are greater than net 
revenue losses from applying too much.  Yield risks from weather uncertainty and 
possibly asymmetric losses need to be considered in estimating farmers’ potential costs of 
  6the Yield Reserve Program.  Ignoring such loss asymmetry may lead to unrealistic 
projections of potential Yield Reserve Program costs and adoption rates by farmers.   
  Farmers’ applications of N also may be heavily influenced by recommended rates 
of the Cooperative Extension Service, state agencies, crop consultants, and other 
advisors.  Recommended rates are particularly important under a Yield Reserve Program 
as they are the baseline from which a 15-percent reduction in N application is calculated 
(Simpson).   
 
Empirical Model 
We developed an empirical model to estimate corn yields and net revenues under a prior 
N application strategy and with N applications constrained by the Yield Reserve 
Program.  Expected net revenue is set equal to the yield times the price of corn, $102/Mg 
($2.58/bu), net of transportation, drying and marketing costs of $7.14/Mg, ($0.18/bu), 
minus the N application times the price of N, $0.62/kg ($0.28/lb).  Other costs are 
assumed fixed.  Corn and N prices are the five-year average prices for 2000 to 2004 
adjusted to 2005 dollars (USDA NASS, 2006).  Nitrogen response functions under 
different rainfall patterns are estimated for N experimental trials in Virginia and North 
Carolina.  Probabilities are assigned to seasonal rainfall based on historical weather data.  
Two prior N application strategies are considered:  1) N applications to maximize 
expected net revenues; and 2) N applications based on recommended rates of the Virginia 
Cooperative Extension Service.  The Yield Reserve Program N application is set at 15 
percent below the amount recommended by Virginia Cooperative Extension.  
Cooperative Extension fertilizer recommendations are often used as the target application 
  7level in nutrient management programs (Virginia Department of Conservation and 
Recreation).  Even at these recommended rates, N losses to the environment can occur 
because of crop inefficiencies in removing applied N (Scharf and Alley). 
Yield Response Curves   
Experimental data from 2000-2003 (representing 15 site years) in North Carolina 
(Sripada et al.) and from 2002-2004 (5 site years) in Virginia (Phillips) were used to 
estimate corn yield response to N.  The data were analyzed with quadratic linear 
regression and nonlinear regression utilizing the Mitscherlich function (Yaron et al.).  
The quadratic and the Mitscherlich equations produced similar results including 
R
2 values.  The quadratic equation was selected because it is simpler to apply and 
interpret compared to a non-linear regression approach, and because the quadratic 
equations always produced non-zero values for all of the parameters, which was not the 
case for all of the Mitscherlich equations.  The quadratic function takes the following 
form: 
    ( 5 )  
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where Ycj equals observed yield, N is applied N, N
2 is the square of N, and α, β, and γ are 
estimated parameters.   
All of the regressions produced significant models except for one site in 2002 in 
North Carolina and one site in 2002 in Virginia where low rainfall limited the impact of 
N fertilizer on yield.  Three categories of yield responses were determined for the data.  
The data from 2003 and 2004 were used to form the high-yield group, because these 
years gave the highest response to N.  Average yield groups were formed based on the 
2000 and 2001 data, and the low-yield group was based on the 2002 data.   
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Weather Probabilities 
Historical weather data were used to determine the probabilities of weather 
corresponding to high, average, or low yield conditions.  Historic yields in Eastern 
Virginia for 47 years (1953-2004) were regressed against rainfall amounts during the 
growing season and trend.  This regression facilitated grouping historical yields into three 
categories based on rainfall.  The probabilities associated with the rainfall categories 
were used to weight yield response curves.  The weighted yield response curves were 
used to determine optimal N applications and costs of restricting N applications based on 
weather probabilities.   
Corn yield data were obtained from the National Agricultural Statistics Service 
from 1958 to 2004 for 28 counties in the Virginia Coastal Plain (USDA NASS).  The 
study area forms the southeast portion of the Chesapeake Bay drainage area.  Weighted 
average corn yield data were determined by summing the total production of corn for 
each year and dividing by the area harvested.  Rainfall data were obtained from the 
Southeast Regional Climate Center’s website (Southeast Regional Climate Center) for the 
corresponding years.  In order to mitigate spatial variability in rainfall, rainfall data from 
five weather stations in the area were averaged.   
  Yields were regressed against a time trend (1958 = 1, 2004 = 47) and growing 
season rainfall.  The regressors were each individually plotted against the response 
variable.  The plots suggested that the regressors would have a better fit if square root of 
time trend and natural logarithms of monthly rainfall were used.  After the 
transformations were completed, a regression was run using R-square and the 
  9encyclopedic (using all combinations of the variables) selection criteria in SAS (SAS).  
The best model, which is defined as the model which is most parsimonious, has highest 
R
2, and has all regressors significant, is shown below.  The variables include square root 
of year trend (sqrtyear) and natural logarithm of rainfall in centimeters for each month 
(lnmay, lnjune, and lnjuly).  The adjusted R-squared value is 0.75.    
(6) Yield = -54.272 + 10.72239sqrtyear + 14.760lnmay+20.504lnjune+29.321lnjuly 
                       (<.0001)  (<.0001)                     (.002)           (<.0001)        (<.0001)  
where yield refers to Mg of corn per hectare and coefficient significance levels are shown 
in parentheses. 
Equation 6 was used to derive detrended yields corresponding to rainfall 
conditions for each weather year.  Based on the application of equation 6 to the historic 
rainfall and yield data, the lowest yield for 2003 and 2004 (years with good growing 
season rainfall) is 8.3 Mg/ha.  The highest yield for 2000 and 2001 (years with average 
growing season rainfall) is 7.9 Mg/ha.  The average of these yields, 8.1 Mg/ha, is used as 
the boundary between good and average yields.  Similarly, the lowest estimated yield for 
2000 and 2001 is 7.6 Mg/ha.  The estimated yield for 2002, the year with low 
experimental yields is 5.6 Mg/ha.  The average of the 5.6 and 7.6 yields, 6.6 Mg/ha, is 
used as the boundary between yields in average and poor rainfall years.  There were 6 
years that fell into the highest yield group, 23 in the average yield group, and 18 in the 
low yield group.  The corresponding probabilities of these types of years occurring are 13 
percent for a good (high-yield) year, 49 percent for an average (average-yield) year, and 
38 percent for a bad (low-yield) year. 
 
  10Soil Productivity Groups  
The soil on which each experiment was conducted is classified in a Soil Productivity  
Group as defined in the Virginia Nutrient Management and Standards Criteria (Criteria) 
(Virginia Department of Conservation and Recreation).  The potential yields assigned to 
each Soil Productivity Group in the Criteria were used to apply yield response curves 
from the experiments to other soils.  An adjustment percentage was calculated, which 
equaled the ratio of potential yield for each Soil Productivity Group relative to the 
Productivity Group on which the experiment was conducted.  Adjustment percentages 
were multiplied by the linear and quadratic terms in each yield response curve to obtain 
estimated yield responses to N for the soil groups not included in the field experiments.  
The intercepts were not adjusted because yields on different soils in the study area are not 
expected to vary greatly at low levels of fertilizer application.   
Total areas in Soil Productivity Groups I, II, and III in the Virginia Coastal Plain 
were quantified using soil profiles obtained from the USDA Natural Resource 
Conservation Service’s Soil Data Mart (USDA NRCS, no date).  The corn acreage in 
each Soil Productivity Group was estimated by multiplying its percentage share of the 
total area in groups I, II, and III times the average amount of corn acreage for the 
Virginia Coastal Plain for 2000-2004 (USDA NASS).  Although the Criteria define 5 soil 
productivity groups, only Soil Productivity Groups I, II, and III are included because they 
account for almost all corn production in the study area.   
  11N Applications 
Two prior N application strategies, the first based on Cooperative Extension 
recommendations and the second based on expected net revenue maximization, were 
considered.  Cooperative Extension recommendations are 196, 174, and 152 kg N/ha, 
respectively, for Groups I, II, and III.  Cooperative Extension N fertilizer 
recommendations are based on an efficiency of 0.02 kg N/kg grain (1.0 lb N/bu) of corn 
grain production potential for individual soil series (Virginia Department of Conservation 
and Recreation).  Yield potential for each soil series is established from yield records 
over several years (usually 5) from research and on-farm trials.  Virginia corn yield 
potential levels for individual soils were updated in 2005 (Baker).  The N fertilizer 
recommendations will generally be the rate that will achieve 90 to 95% of maximum 
yield potential based on corn yield response to N fertilization trials.   
The N application that maximizes net revenue on each of k =3 soil productivity 
groups is estimated as follows:   





41 ... 1 : ) (
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where prjk is probability of obtaining a yield response of Yijk for an application rate of Nik 
on the k
th Soil Productivity Group.  For the i
th N application on Soil Productivity Group k 
there are j = 20 possible yield responses (depending on weather and site conditions) 
corresponding to the 20 yield response equations estimated for the experimental sites as 
applied to the k
th Soil Productivity Group.  For a given Soil Productivity Group, the 
composite, weighted- average yield response function is obtained by summing the yield 
response of each equation for an experimental site (as applied to that Soil Productivity 
Group) multiplied by its probability.  The probability of each yield response equation is 
  12related to growing season rainfall (good rainfall probability = 0.13, average rainfall 
probability = 0.49, and poor rainfall probability = 0.38) as follows.  Each yield response 
estimated for a given type of rainfall year is assumed to be equally likely.  Each of the 10 
equations estimated for good rainfall years (2003 and 2004) is given a probability of 
0.13/10 = .013.  Each of the 7 equations estimated for average rainfall years (2000 and 
2001) has a 0.49/7 = 0.07 probability and each of the 3 equations estimated for low 
rainfall years (2002) has a 0.38/3 = 0.127 probability.   
The expected net revenue maximizing strategy is found by searching over 41 
potential application rates varying in 9 kg/ha (8 lb/ac) increments from 0 to 360 kg/ha 
(320 lb/ac).  Expected net revenue maximization occurs at N applications of 225, 216, 
and 207 kg/ha for Soil Productivity Groups I, II, and III, respectively.   
 
Farmer Compensation and Taxpayer Costs   
Farmers’ expected costs of the Yield Reserve Program are equal to estimated expected 
net revenue in the baseline using the prior N application strategy minus expected net 
revenue under the Yield Reserve Program prior to compensation.  Expected costs may be 
offset by compensation.  Three compensation scenarios are investigated:  insurance-only, 
incentive-only, and a combined set of insurance and enhanced incentive payments.  The 
insurance-only scheme provides compensation to the participating farmer during a year 
when yield losses occur due to applying N below recommended rates.  Losses are 
compensated at the assumed market price.  Losses are certified by planting check strips in 
the field, which are fertilized at recommended rates.  The incentive-only scheme provides 
the farmer a fixed annual payment equal to the expected value of net revenue losses from 
  13applying N at a rate 15 percent below the extension recommended levels.  There is no 
insurance adjustment for yield losses under this scheme.  The incentive scheme takes 
account of savings realized by a farmer from reduced N applications and reduced harvest, 
transportation, and marketing costs for the lower yield.   
The combined set of enhanced incentive and insurance payments is expected to 
provide the highest overall level of compensation to farmers and, therefore, to induce the 
widest level of participation.  This option provides an enhanced incentive payment of $74 
per hectare ($30 per acre), which is higher than the expected level of the incentive 
payment under option 1.  In addition, the program provides an insurance payment, which 
covers yield losses in years when yields are reduced due to lower fertilizer rates 
(Sweeney).  For all three compensation schemes, yield losses are calculated relative to 
the yields that would have been earned from applying N at the level recommended by 
extension.  If net revenue-maximizing N applications are higher than extension 
recommendations, farmers’ losses may be higher. 
Cost of the program to taxpayers under each payment scenario (assuming 100 
percent farmer participation) is estimated by summing farmer incentive and insurance 
payments plus administrative costs times the estimated number of hectares of corn 
produced in the Virginia Coastal Plain.  Administrative costs for verifying N applications 
and yield losses under the Yield Reserve Program are estimated as $7.40/ha (Simpson).   
 
Results 
  Assuming farmers currently follow extension recommendations in applying N, the 
estimated cost to farmers of the Yield Reserve Program (reduction in expected net 
  14revenue) ranges from $13 (Soil Group I) to $10 (Soil Group III) per ha (Table 1).  Costs 
are incurred because of yield reductions averaging 0.3 Mg/ha.  The costs are lowered 
somewhat by savings from reduced N applications, which fall by 29, 26, and 23 kg/ha on 
Soil Groups I, II, and III, respectively.  Costs are higher on higher productivity soil 
groups because they have slightly greater yield losses from reduced N applications.   
  If current N applications are based on net revenue maximization, farmer costs per 
ha of the Yield Reserve Program are higher:  $17 (Soil Group I) to $20 (Group III) (Table 
1).  Costs are higher because the Yield Reserve Program imposes larger restrictions on N 
applications by net revenue maximizers.  When farmers apply N to maximize expected 
net revenue, N application rates are higher compared to extension recommendations.  For 
example, N application on Soil Group I increases from 196 to 225 kg/ha, a 15 percent 
increase (Table 1, row 1).  The 15-percent reduction in N application under the Yield 
Reserve Program is computed based on extension recommendations; consequently, the N 
application on Soil Group I is reduced by 58 kg/ha (compared to a 29-kg/ha reduction for 
those following extension recommendations).  However, expected costs of the Yield 
Reserve Program are still not large—the largest cost of $20 for Soil Group III is less than 
4 percent of baseline expected net revenue.  N applications higher than extension 
recommendations bring only modest yield increases, 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4 Mg/ha on Soil 
Groups I, II, and III, respectively,  and net revenue increases, $4, $8, and $10/ha, 
respectively (Table 1, rows 2 and 3).  Consequently, the reductions in net revenues from 
the Yield Reserve Program are not much larger (in absolute terms) for net revenue 
maximizers than for those following extension recommendations.   
  15Yield reserve compensation and mean net revenue with compensation (Table 2) 
are the same for both N application strategies because N applications are restricted to the 
same level, 15 percent below Cooperative Extension recommendations.  The Yield 
Reserve Program compensation under the incentive-only scheme is set equal to the 
expected cost of the program with N applications restricted to 15 percent below extension 
recommendations (Table 2).  Incentive-only compensation of $10 to $13/ha (Table 2) 
covers only one half to three fourths of the $17 to $20 costs of the Yield Reserve 
Program for net revenue maximizers (Table 1).  Insurance-only compensation ($27 to 
$39/ha) is up to three times larger than incentive-only compensation.  With insurance, all 
reductions in yield from the extension baseline are compensated at the market price.  
Savings from reduced N applications and reduced yield transportation costs are not 
deducted from compensation paid to farmers as is the case under the incentive-only 
scheme.  Compensation under the enhanced-incentive plus insurance plan is highest of 
the three plans evaluated, three to four times higher than the insurance-only plan (Table 
2).  Compensation includes coverage of yield losses relative to yields under the extension 
baseline plus an enhanced incentive of $74/ha.  The $74 enhanced incentive is larger than 
expected costs of the Yield Reserve Program.   
After factoring in the Yield Reserve Program compensation, expected net revenue 
per ha is generally larger under the Yield Reserve Program compared to the baseline for 
all soil groups (Table 2 versus Table 1).  The one exception is incentive-only 
compensation under the net revenue-maximizing baseline for which expected net 
revenues decline by $4 to $10/ha.  Farmers seeking to maximize expected net revenues 
  16should have incentives to participate if their prior probabilities of yield reductions under 
the Yield Reserve Program match those used in this study.   
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Farmers may tend to forget the bad years and overestimate the response of yields to N 
(Sri Ramaratnam et. al.; Pease), which would increase the perceived costs of the Yield 
Reserve Program.  The sensitivity of expected costs of the Program to perceived yield 
probabilities is examined under two additional weather probability scenarios.  In the first 
scenario, farmers are assumed to forget all but the most extreme bad years.  The year 
2002 is the most recent drought year with poor yields and has the 7
th lowest predicted 
yield in the past 47 years based on the trend model (equation 6).  Predicted yields for 
2002 (equation 6) are used as the cutoff for low yield years.  Only years with yields lower 
than those predicted for 2002 are included as low yield years with other years being 
reclassified as average years.  The resulting probabilities are 72, 15, and 13 percent for 
average, bad, and good years, respectively.  In the second scenario, farmers are assumed 
to forget all bad years, which are reclassified as average years.  Resulting probabilities for 
average and good years are 87 percent and 13 percent, respectively.   In this scenario, 
estimated equations for 2002 are not used in estimating yield losses under the Yield 
Reserve Program.  In both scenarios, N applications are based on extension 
recommendations.   
  Under scenario 1, expected costs of the Yield Reserve Program are almost double 
compared to cost estimates based on initial probabilities, with costs ranging from $26 on 
Soil Group I to $19 on Soil Group III.  Under scenario 2, expected costs of the Yield 
  17Reserve Program are almost triple the initial costs estimates ranging from $35 on Soil 
Group I to $24 on Soil Group III.  Costs of the Yield Reserve Program are low or even 
negative in drought years because there is little or no crop response to N and farmers save 
money by applying less N.  Lowering the probability of drought years reduces this 
advantage of the Yield Reserve Program and increases the expected cost.  However, 
under both scenarios, expected costs are only 3-4 percent of baseline expected net 
revenues.   
  Increases in the cost of N would lower costs of the Yield Reserve Program as 
farmers save more money from lowering their N applications.  A 25 percent increase in 
the price of N (to $0.77/kg) lowers the expected cost of the Yield Reserve Program by $5, 
$4, and $3 on Soil Groups I, II, and III, respectively (30 to 38 percent reduction) with N 
applications based on extension recommendations.  Increased corn prices raise the value 
of yield losses from lowering N applications and increase the costs of the Yield Reserve 
Program.  A 25 percent increase in corn price raises expected cost of the Yield Reserve 
Program by more than 50 percent to $17 to $21/ha.   
 
Taxpayer costs  
Taxpayer costs of the Yield Reserve Program in the Virginia Coastal Plain vary 
significantly by compensation scheme.  The lowest cost plan is incentive-only with a total 
cost of approximately $1.6 million (Table 3).  Costs are low because savings from 
reduced N and crop transportation costs are accounted for and reduce the amount of 
payment.  Based on the estimates presented here, farmers following extension 
recommendations would just break even with no additional compensation for bearing 
  18risk.  The insurance plan would be twice as expensive as the incentive-only plan because 
farmers are compensated for yield losses while savings from reduced N and reduced crop 
harvest costs are not deducted from farmers’ compensation.  The cost of the proposed 
enhanced- incentive plus insurance plan, $9.7 million, is six times more expensive than 
the incentive-only plan, because it includes an insurance payment plus an enhanced 
incentive payment, $74/ha, which is higher than the estimated expected cost of the Yield 
Reserve Program to farmers.    
McCann and Easter estimate an average transaction cost of $30.94/ha for all 
agricultural conservation programs, which is almost four times higher than the $7.40 rate 
used in this study.  If the $30.94 rate were used, taxpayer costs would increase to $3.6, 
$5.4, and $11.8 million, respectively, for incentive, insurance, and enhanced-incentive 
plus insurance compensation schemes.   
Yield Reserve Program costs per kg of N reduction depend on how N reductions 
are defined and the baseline from which reductions are measured.  Here N reductions are 
defined as reductions in residual N, which is defined as the amount of applied N not 
removed by the crop.  Crop removal is estimated as crop yield for the given N application 
amount (Table 1) times N removal per unit of yield.  Corn removes an estimated 16.1 kg 
N per Mg of grain harvested (Virginia Cooperative Extension Service).   
Bosch et al. conducted a survey of farmers’ nutrient application practices in a 
portion of the study area.  They concluded that most surveyed farmers applied close to 
extension recommended levels of N.  If this finding holds generally true in the study area, 
total residual N reductions are an estimated 1.8 million kg and costs per kg of N 
reduction are $0.91, $1.88, and $5.47 per kg, respectively, for incentive-only, insurance-
  19only, and enhanced-incentive plus insurance plans (Table 3).  If farmers apply N to 
maximize expected net revenue, the estimated reduction is almost 3 times larger, 5.2 
million kg.  Compared to the extension baseline, estimated costs per kg of residual N 
reduction are one third as high—$0.31, $0.64, and $1.86 per kg, respectively, for 
incentive-only, insurance-only, and enhanced-incentive plus insurance plans.   
 
Summary and Conclusions   
Policymakers are searching for ways to reduce NPS pollution from farms.  A Yield 
Reserve Program proposal would compensate farmers for reducing N applications by 15 
percent below extension recommendations.  This study analyzes the policy proposal for 
the Virginia Coastal Plain under three compensation plans: incentive-only, insurance- 
only, and enhanced-incentive plus insurance.   
  Assuming farmers follow extension recommendations in applying N, expected 
costs of the Yield Reserve Program (reductions in expected net revenue from limiting N 
applications) are $10 to $13/ha or 3 to 4 percent of baseline expected net revenue.  Costs 
are somewhat higher for farms who apply N to maximize expected net revenue, $17 to 
$20/ha, but still less than 4 percent of expected net revenue.  Reducing the probability of 
low rainfall years increases the expected cost of the Yield Reserve Program because yield 
penalties from limiting N applications are highest under average to good rainfall years.   
However, even with all low rainfall years removed, costs are $35/ha or less.  Yield 
Reserve Program costs are sensitive to N and corn prices.  Increasing the N price lowers 
Program costs because farmers save more money from the lower N applications.  
  20Increased corn prices increase Program costs because of the higher value of yield losses 
from lower N applications.   
  Taxpayer costs would be lowest under the incentive-only plan, which limits 
compensation to expected costs of Yield Reserve Program participation.  Insurance-only 
and enhanced-incentive plus insurance plans would have higher costs due to higher 
compensation paid to farmers and costs of administration.  The taxpayer cost per kg 
reduction in residual N is sensitive to the incentive scheme and the assumed N 
application in the baseline prior to the Yield Reserve Program.  If farmers follow 
extension recommendations, average costs per kg reduction in residual N vary from $0.91 
to $5.47/kg depending on compensation.   
The Yield Reserve Program can reduce N applications, and can potentially reduce 
nutrient pollution in waterways.  The level of farmer participation and costs to taxpayers 
and farmers will depend on how the program is implemented.  Whether the Yield 
Reserve Program is implemented and at what level will depend on perceived benefits of 
nutrient reduction, costs of alternative programs for reducing nutrient pollution, and other 
factors.  Several issues related to the economic viability of yield reserve for nutrient 
pollution control require further study.  The transactions costs of yield reserve and other 
approaches to reducing nutrient pollution should be compared (McCann and Easter).  The 
potential to enhance the cost effectiveness of yield reserve by targeting payments should 
be investigated (Carpentier, Bosch, and Batie; Zhang, Horan, and Claassen).  The effect 
of recent weather on farmers’ perceived yield risk and perceived costs of the Yield 
Reserve Program deserves more study.  Because land and machinery costs are variable in 
the long run, farmers’ costs of participation could rise as these costs are spread over 
  21lower yields.  These costs should be estimated to determine if they present significant 
barriers to participation.  The potential effects of drawing down soil residual N levels on 
Yield Reserve Program participation and costs should be examined further (Brown; 
Yadav, Peterson, and Easter).  Reductions in yields from reduced N applications may 
increase over time in such fields thus increasing farmers’ participation costs and perhaps 
the compensation necessary to induce farmers to participate.  Finally, the relationship 
between recommended rates and profit-maximizing rates should be regularly reassessed 
in light of constantly increasing corn yields and ethanol-induced higher corn prices.  
Stable recommended rates over as much as 10 years fail to account for yield and price 
impacts that will affect willingness of farmers to participate in a Yield Reserve Program. 
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  28Table 1.  Effects of Yield Reserve Program Scenarios on N Applications, Mean Yields, 
and Mean Farmer Net Revenues 
  N Applications Based on  
 Cooperative  Extension 
Recommendations 





























Baseline          
1. N application    kg/ha  196  174 152 225 216  207
2. Mean yield    Mg/ha  8.0  7.4 6.8 8.2 7.7  7.2
3. Mean net 
revenue  
$/ha 639  593 550 643 601  560
Costs of reduced N applications under Yield Reserve Program   
4. N application   kg/ha  167  148 129 167 148  129
5. Mean yield    Mg/ha  7.7  7.1 6.5 7.7 7.1  6.5
6. Mean net 
revenue  
$/ha 626  582 540 626 582  540
7. Mean cost 
(row 3 –  
     row 6) 
$/ha 13  12 10 17 19  20
 
 








1.  Mean net revenue before compensation  626 582  540
   
Yield Reserve Program compensation ($/ha)   
2. Incentive only   13 12  10
3. Insurance only
b 39 33 27
4. Enhanced incentive + insurance
c   113 107  101
Mean net revenue with Yield Reserve Program compensation ($/ha)   
5. Incentive only (row 1 + row 2)  639 594  550
6. Insurance only (row 1 + row 3)  665 615  567
7.  Enhanced incentive + insurance (row 1 + row 4)  739 689  641
aCompensation and net revenues apply to both N application strategies. 
bAmounts shown are mean payments.  Payments vary from 0 to a maximum of $115 
(Group I), $98 (Group II), and $81 (Group III).   
cAmounts shown are the mean insurance payment (row 3) plus an enhanced incentive 
payment of $74/ha (Simpson, 2005).  Payments per ha vary from a minimum of $74 to a 
maximum of $189 (Group I), $172 (Group II), and $155 (Group III). 
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Table 3.  Reduced N Applications and Mean Taxpayer Costs of Yield Reserve 
 






321,823 702,360 751,539 1,775,722
Maximum revenue  
baseline 
658,021 1,894,917 2,663,981 5,216,919
Taxpayer costs ($) 
Incentive only 
Total cost  $266,000 $623,162 $723,474 $1,612,636
Cost/ha  $20 $19 $18 $19
Cost/kg residual N 
reduction (extension 
baseline) 
$0.83 $0.89 $0.96 $0.91
Cost/kg residual N 
reduction (maximum 
revenue baseline) 
$0.40 $0.33 $0.27 $0.31
Insurance only  
Total cost   $611,800 $1,311,920 $1,406,755 $3,330,475
Cost/ha  $46 $40 $35 $39
Cost/kg residual N 
reduction (extension 
baseline) 
$1.90 $1.87 $1.87 $1.88
Cost/kg residual N 
reduction (maximum 
revenue baseline) 
$0.93 $0.69 $0.53 $0.64
Enhanced incentive + insurance 
Total cost  $1,596,000 $3,738,972 $4,381,037 $9,716,009
Cost/ha  $120 $114 $109 $113
Cost/kg residual N 
reduction (extension 
baseline) 
$4.96 $5.32 $5.83 $5.47
Cost/kg residual N 
reduction (maximum 
revenue baseline) 
$2.43 $1.97 $1.64 $1.86
aCosts are mean values for the Virginia Coastal Plain assuming 100 percent participation 
on corn acres. Costs include farmer compensation plus a $7.40/ha administrative cost. 
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